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PREFACE.
The College Fraternity is but one of the large
class of organizations whose legal status is not very clearly
defined. Social clubs and other kindred societies abound
in our cities and villages and exist for the nere pleasure of
their members and for, no other purpose. They are seldom
of sufficient importanc, to bring the legal questionsto which
they give birth into the higher courts, and we cant therefore
find but few reported decisions to enlighten us upon the
rules of law which govern this class of organizations. In
England however, the position of these societies and their
internal and external relations have been the subjects of
considerable litigation, and hence over there the law has be-
come more settled. The few decisions which the American
reports supply are in nearly all oases based upon the English
law, and I have not hesitated to cite English authorities
when unable to find any American cases directly in point.
The title of this thesis may hot be a very good index of
its contents, but it should be borne in mind that the College
-2-
Fraternity is but one of the large class and there are no
rules of law peculiar to itself. The majority of these so-
cieties are not incorporated and the greater portion of this
work is devoted to the discussion of the principles of law
applicale to unincorporated societies which ere usually
termed in the books "Voluntary Associations". However,
many fraternity chapters have ,con incorporated, as every
well organized chapter ought to be, and I have endeavored in
the last chapter to outline the procedure incident to incor-
poration under the "Social Club" statute in New York State.
The form given in the appendix is one which has already stood
the test.
Addison C. Ormsbcc.
Cornell University
gist. of "ay, 1894.
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CHAPTL11 I.
-- 0--
THE LEGAL STATUS CF TVE UNINCC PCRATED FRATERNITY.
The college fraternity belomgs to a class of orga-
nizations which occupies a somewhat anomalous position in
the law. They bear resemblance to both the Corporation and
the partnership, yet are not identical with either. It is
because of their resemblance to these two great classes of
combinations of individuals that conisiderable confusion exists
among the cases many of which seem to have boon decided upon
the principle that every such combination must be either a
corporation or a partnership, if it is not the one it must
of necessity be the other. But a fraternal society is not
a corporation unless by virtue of statute law. There is
no grant from the sovereign power. The society has n--
existance apart from the individuals who compose it. It re-
sembles a corporation in that it may provide a constitution
and by-laws regulating admission and expulsion of members etc.
and in that the members may be constantly changing, but a
-2-
member of' such a society does not possess the transferable
interest which is incidental to membeOrsip in a corporation.
Neither is such a society a partnership. A partnership
as defined by Lindley is"The contract relation subsisting be-
tween persons who have combined their property, labor, or
skill in an enterprise or business, as principals for pecu-
niary profit". Pecuniary profit is the essential object of
a partnership. Whatever definition may be considered the
correct one, they all embody the idea that a partnership must
exist for a business purpose and for that alone. This is
manifestly not the object of a fraternal society.
-3-
CHAPTIR II.
-0-
WHAT IS L21- i'RSIP ?
Membership in . society arises out of contract.
This contract consists of' the written and unwritten laws of
the society. The most important evidence of this contract
are the constitution and by-laws of the society, if it has
any. One of the essentials of a binding contract is mutu-
ality, the consent of a party to be bound. It is therefore
obvious that in order that a person may be bound by the arti-
cles in a constitution he must have either expressly or by
implication consented to assume the duties and responsibili-
ties arising from the contract of which these articles are
evidence, expressly by placing his signature beneath the con-
stitution or by a declaration to the effect that he assumes
such duties and responsibilities, impliedly by ohtering into
the full rights and privileges of membership in such scciety
with knowledge of the existance of its constitution.
The constitution and by-laws of a society will determine
the effect of the contractual relation so far as they can be
applied. The courts have fully recognized their supremacy
when questions involving their binding force have come up
for decision and they will be enforced as between the parties
tc the c ntract, no matter whether they are reasonable or
not, so long as there is nothing illegal or U. ionable
about thema. The principle vfhich obtains generally both in
England and in the United States is clearly stated in the
opinion in a Pennsylvania case, (Leach v. Harris, 2 Brewsters,
571, ) as follows, "where an association is organized not in
pursuance of any statute and the terms of membership are not
fixed by the Common Law, the agreement which the members make
among themselves on the subject must establish and determine
the rights of the partie.s. The constitution of an associa-
tion and its terms agreed upon form the law which should
govern. The members have established a law themselves."
But the articles of association must not be unconscion-
able or contrary to the law4r of the land,. A good illustra-
tion of such a defect is found in (State v. Williams, 75 N.C.
i34) vhcre the constitution of a society called the Good
-4-
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Samaritans provided for cortain cercmonies which should attend
the expulsion of an offending member and which consisted in
tying a rope about the waist of the of'fondor and suspending
him in mid air. The court hold that such a provision was in
violation of the law of the land, and that an attempt to en-
force it would constitute a battery for which those who par-
tici pated could be held criminally liablo.
Ordinarily the courts are reluctant to entertain quest-
ions involving voluntary associations and if they entertain
them at all are disposed to give them a liberal construction;
this though ±s altered and the courts will enforce a strict
conformity to the articles of association against any members
who may attempt to use force or violance in connection with
association management.
Irving v. Forbs, 11 Barb., 587.
Ugnst v. Shortz, F Whart., 506.
Runkel v. Winemuller, 4 H. & KIcH.,(Nd. ) 429.
-6-
CHAPTER IIl.
-- 0--
POWER OF TIMM 11AJORITY
An interesting question arises as to how far a ma-
jority of the members of a society may act so as to bind the
minority. Ordinarily the act of a majority at a meeting of
which due notice has been given and at which a quorum is pres-
ent, supposing that the proceedings have been conducted with
due regard to correct parliamentary proceedure, will be bind-
ing upon the minority, and those members who are presentAare
by a parliamentary fiction deemed to be on the side of the
majority. We assume however, that the proceedings have
been regular and that questions have been put before the so-
siety by the person upon whom this duty devolves. A quest-
ion put Atnofficially cannot bind the mem.bars who do not vote
and who, if the question had been properly put, would have
been regarded as a part of the majority. This was demon-
strated in the case of (Com. v. Green, 4 Whart., 604). In
this case a certain faction of a society, upon the refusal of
-7-
an eal from the decision of the presidin7 officer, through
one of their adherents made a motion to degrade him, which
they asserted was carried by their actual votes nd the con-
structive votes of those who refused Io vote. The court
said in the opinion,"To all questions put by the established
orga-1 it is the duty of every member tC respond or Ibe counted
with the greater number because he is supposed to have as-
sented beforehand to the process pro-established to ascertain
the general will, but the rule of implies. asse.-t is certainly
inapplicable to a measure which when justifiable even by ex-
treme necessity is essentially revolutionary and based on no
pre-established process of ascertaimicnt whatever. To aplly
it to an extreme case of inorganic action ac was done here
might work the degradation of any presiding officer in our
legislative halls by the motion and actual vote of a single
mm' sustained by the co.structive votes of all the rest."
The ;ower of the majority may be limited or qualified by
the constitution or by-laws and these will be binding whether
reazonablo or not, and subsequent additio,s or amendments to
them will lihewise b- binding if :v ssed according to methods
ri
prescribed in the original articles.
Kohlenbeck v. Logeman, 10 Daly, 447.
The cases in which the question has been passed upon
indicatc that it lies wivthin the power of the majority to
alter or abrogate the original articles of agreement without
restriction so long as property rights al not violated
thereby. Thus in the case of (smith v. ielson, 18 Vt., 550)
where the right of the majority of the members of a ciurch
congregation to renounce the constitution of the denomination
to which they belonged was in question. The court in its
opinion states the principle as follows, "And of these vol-
untary associations, though they frequently make constitu-
tions and 'pass by-laws which they C-oclare are hot to be alter-
ed, except in a certain way or manner, nevertheless, these
may at any time be altered or abrogated ky the same power
which created them and the vote of any subsequent meeting
abrogating or altering such constitution or by-laws, though
passed only by a majority, hao7 as much efficiency as a pre-
vious vote establishing them".
The above doctrine must be taken subject to this qualil-
-9-
fication, that where property rights are involved the courts
will not allom the majority to unjustly impir them against
the will of the owners. See on this point.
Livingston v. Lynch, 5 Johnson's Ch., 573.
Austin v. Searing, 16 N.Y., 123.
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CHAPTER IV.
ADMISSIOC - TO 1J124BERSHIP.
Although a contract relation exists between a member
and his society after he has Ybecome a member, there is no
such relation between the society and the public through
which a person( regardless of how well qualified he may be)
can compel the society to admit him to membership.
This proposition seems too reasonable to require the
stamp of judicial authority, nevertheless two late cases il-
lustrate the result of a-ttempts to 7ain admission into so-
cieties through the courts. In (IMayer v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters Association, 47 N.J.Equity, 519) the vice chancellor
expressed the logic of the situation in the following well
chosen words. ' These organizations are formed for purposes
mutually agreed upon. Their right to make by-L,,,,. s and rules
for the adrnission of members and the transaction of business
is unquestionable. They may require such qualifications for
membership and such formalities of election as they choose.
-l1-
They may restrict membership to thi ori~incl proToters or
limit the nnfber to be thereafter admitted. The very idea
of such organizations is associations mutually acceptable; or
in accordanot, with regulations agreed upon; a power to require
the admission of any person in any nay objectionable to the
society is ropug-na-It to the scheme of its organizations.----
Courts exist to protect rights and when the right has once
attached they will interfere to prevent its violation, but,no
person has any abstract right to such membership; that depends
upon the action of the society exercised in accordance with
its regulationsand until so admitted no right exists which
the courts cail be called upon to protect or enforce."
(McKano v. Adams, 2 G.,60) is a very interesting ca
case on this point. The plaintiff, John Y.McKane, sought
to compell the democratic general Lcontittce of Kings County
to admit hi to membership therein on the ground that he had
been elected a delegate to such com.ittee and was therefore
entitled to become a member of that committee -ut that by a
majority vote it had refused to recognize him as such a del-
egate. In the course. of his opinion, Judge Grey says,
-12-
ri-ht to bo a -ember is not conferred by any statute; nor is
it derivable as in the ca-me of a corporate body. It is by
reason of the action and of the assent of nembers of a volun-
tary association that it becomes associated with them in the
common undertaking and not by any outside agency or by the
individuals action. iLembership is a -privilege whi-h may be
accorded or withheld and not a right which can be -ainod in-
dependently and then enforced. ------- Ve cannot compare this
case to that of other voluntary associations nor to a co-part-
nership, to which an unincorporated association is .ometimes
likened, when considering the rights of associates in the
property of the association and the methods for their im-
provement. "
CHAPTER V.
-- 0--
EXPULSICN.
The rules pertaining to (;xpulsion although not of
practical importance in connection- with the college fraterni-
ty y-t form so large a '-art of the law relatine to voluntary
associations in 7eneral that an outline of this branch of the
subject may not be inconsistent with the general nature of
this work. At the outset we should note a distinction be-
tween incorporated societies and those not incorporated. In
the former, a memb;er has rights granted by the legislature
which can not be taken away by the society unless authorized
by the governing statute or'charter. In the latter , a
member has no rights of a higher dignity than those springing
out of a voluntary contract bet!()en himself and his fellow
members. Such contracts arc, as we hove seen, upheld when
not contrary to law and a rerier may thereby voluntarily
subject himself to summary expulsion for causes and in modes
which would not be justifiable in the case of (- corporation
existing under a charter or act of the legislature.
-14-
Beach in hi: work on corrorations makes the following
statement, " As may be inferred from the General constitution
of clubs, in tho se;ct of Eny xp;.css rule there is no
power of' expulsion inherent in the mer)eCrs of C club~for such
v Bower forms no ;:rt of the written contract by iihich the
rTembers are bound, and therefore even an otherwise unanimous
vote of the club could not expel a nerfIer who refused to
resign". (Beach on Corpor;tions, Vol. I. p. iCO) Perhaps
we do not c,:tch Mr.Beach's meaning , but if he intends to
assert that a voluntary association of individuals possesses
no inherent power of' expulsion if' its constitution or by-laws
are silent on the subject, we, believe tc statement to be
contrary to the underlying principles of association of indi-
viduals and to the weight of authority. It was a power of a
corporation at Common Law /regardless of charter or by-lawsto
expel a member who had been guilty of an infamous act or who
had committed offenses in violation of his duty as an incor-
porator. And if' under the Ccraon Law the corporation poss-
essed this inherent sower, why hould not clubs or societies
in which the very fundamental basis of organization is the
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compatibil-.ty of' its members and in which quustiono of prop-
erty or of state onfranchisv_(-cnt do not arise have at least
the same privilege as the corporation. I,% believe this
power to be more extensive in voluntary associations then in
corporations. In the English case of C >igby v.Conol, 42 L.T.
130 ) the learned judge states the principle which is support-
ed by the weight of authority as follows, " There is no jur-
isdiction that I am aware of reposed, in this country at
least, in any of the Queen's courts to decide upon the rights
of persons to associate with each other when the asscciation
possesses no property. Persons, and rniany porzozs do assc-
ciato without any property in cor.on at all. A do7en1 people
may agree to meet and play xhist at each others houses for a
certaih period and if olyve of them refuse to associate with
the twelfth any lcnger. I am --ot aw.are that there is zi-y
jurisdiction in any court of justice in this country t6 in-
terfere."
Of course whenever property rights were involved, the
Cormion Law imposed limitations on this power of expulsion and
even when there were no property rights it required -ocd
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faith and honest action according to principles of natural
justice, but t is is merely curtailing the power of expulsion
and not i-nto ring; v it.
.. Granting therefore that a society possesses the inherent
power of expulsion , iwe must take into consido ation the
limits imposed upon this power by the contractual telation
subsisting among the Perfoers, and we may down as a general
preliminary proposition that when the Constitution or by-laws
of a society specify the grounds upon which a member may be
expelled or,,place it within the discretion of dertain members
to determine the ground's of expulsion, a person becoming a
member of such an organization and either expressly or by im-
plication consenting to be bound by such constitution and
by-laws is bound by them no matter how unreasonable may be
the provisions in regard to expulsion , and the fact that the
society has property merely for society purposes does not
give the member such a pecuniary or property right as will
justify the interference of the court to prevent his expul-
sion so long as the requirements of the law in respect to all
associations are followed. This is ettled law both in England
-17-
and in'the United States.
In taking up the specific questions arising under expul-
sion, we observe, first, that the power to expel a member
from a society exists only in the society at largc unless the
articles of association vest this power in a smaller number
as in the board of directors, the trustees, or the managing
comittee. 'e No decisions have been found directly in point
on this proposition but it is supported by considerable dicta.
In (Innes v. Wylie, 1 Car.& K. 262), a member was expelled
by a majority vote from a society whose by-laws wore silent
on 'the subject of expulsion. The court held the expulsion
unlawful because opportunity had n. t been given to the member
to defend himself before the meeting at which his expulsion
Was considered , but it said through Denman,C.J., "I an of
the opinion that when there is not any property in which all
the members of a society have a joint interest the majority
may by resolutions remove any one member. " This dictum has
been cited approvingly in (Thite v. Brownell, 4 Abb.(N.S) 162)
the leading American case on the general subject of voluntary
associations. .
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The constitution or by-laws of -. society -enerally pro-
vide in what body the nowcr of expulsion is lod-ed, usually
in a comnitte or board of directors. This comrittee or
Lbard is sometirmes given exclusive jurisdiction but usually
an appeal is allowed to the society at large. it is obvious
that nc coimmittee, board cf directors, or trustees have avny
jurisdiction to expel members unless PuOh VOWer bc expressly
conferred by the articles of' association. The function of
such bodies is to conduct the business of the a-sociation
and not to determine natters concerninrg its constituent char-
acter.
Secondly, the judicatory in a society has exclusive jur-
isdiction to determine what conduct in a member will justify
his expulsion but it must not transcend the limits imposed by
the articles ;f association. The exercise of this discretion
in good faith and within the required limits will not be
questioned in a court of equity.
Lyttleton v. Blackbur, 33 L.T., 641.
White v. Trov'mell, 4 Abb.(N..3) 162.
Thirdly, the law imposes the following duties upon such
-10-
judicatory; That it will act in good faith and without malice;
that due notice shall be given to the accused ncnLer of the
time and place where his case is to be considCred and that he
shall be allowed an opportunity to be heard and to give evi-
dence in his defense; and that all proceedings shall be
regular and conducted according to principles of natural
justice.
These last propositions are .:ettleod lfaw in England and t
the E h-lish cases deciding them have teen approved and fol
lowed in this country. The leading English cases supporting
these propositions are,
Hopkinson v. liar uis of Exeter, 17 L.T., 368.
Gardner v. Freonantle, 24 L.T., 65.
Dawkins v. Atrotius, 44 L.T., 557.
Fisher v. Kean, 41 L.T., 335.
In the latter case the court says, " The conmittee are
bound to act according to ordinary principles of justice, and
are not to convict a mran of a grave offense which shall war-
rant his expulsion from the club without fair, adequate, and
sufficient notice and an opportunity of meeting the accusa-
-20-
tions brought a'-ainst him. They ought not as I understand
it according to the ordinary rules by which justice shouldbe
administered by committees of clubs or by any other body of
persons who decide upon the conduct of others, to blast a man's
reputation forever, perhaps to ruin his prosnects for life,
without giving him an opportunity of either def(;nding or pal-
liating his conduct, and when such notice has not been given
the court will interfere by injunction restraining the com-
mittee from carrying out their resolution to expel the member'
The English doctrine is appoved and followed in,
White v. Bro. nll, 4 Abb.(N.S. ) 102.
Hutchinson v. Lawrencr, 37 How. Pr., 381.
Fourthly, when the article-s of association specify the
grounds of oxnulsion and the proceedure with rega.rd to time
of notice and etc., they must be strictly followed by the
judicatcry.
This proposition is in harmony with the general rules of
law relating to procedure in cases where personal rights are
involved, and if the articles of association specify a certain
time when notice shall be given of a meeting in which the
-2l-
expulsion of a member is to be authorizvd and decided upon,
a variation from this provision will give sufficient ground
to a member who should. be expelled at nis meeting to call
upon the courts of equity.
Thus in C Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliff, )
where the rules of a sccLoty required that a notice of such
meeting should be posted fourteen days in advance and notice
was posted on the first of November, for a trial to be had on
the fourteenth. The .em-ber who was expelled from the soci-
ety as a result of this meeting, a-aled to the court on the
ground of insufficient notice and the court held that the
notic, was not sufficient to support the sentence of expulsion
Fifthly, a member must first exhaust his remedies within
the society before the courts will entertain his case. Thus
if an appeal is given from the judicatory which has passed
the sentence of suspension or expulsion either to a higher
judicatory or to the society at large, the complaining member
cannot call upon a Court of Equity for redress until he has
prosecuted. the a-peal within the society unless by evasions,
intentional delays, or other unjust proc.,dure he is deprived
-22-
of any further renedy given him bLy the constitution or by-laws
of the society. But where the laws of a society provide for
no a -clate tribunal within the society the r-,ember may appeal
directly to the judicial dourts.
White v. Brownell, 4 Abb. (N.S. ) 1C2,199.
Lafond v. Deems, 31 '. Y., 507.
Loubat v. Leroy, 40 Hun, 546.
The usual relief where members of unincorporated clubs
or other societies are unlawfully expelled is by au injunct-
ion in a court of' Equity. Authority has been found in an
English case for the proposition that no action for d hmages
will lie against the committee of a society which docrees an
unlawvful expulsion. A genius for refinement has discovered
a reason for this conclusion in that the act of expulsion
being void, the plaintiff¢ has sustained nb injury since not-
-iithstanding.the expulsion he is still a member. ( Wood v.
Wood, 9lExch., 190). If this holding be accepted as the law
it results that the expelled member must either resort to the
remedy of injunction or else he must attempt to assert his
rights in the scciety by force and if he 1, forcibly ejected,
bring an action f'or the assault. In (Innes v. Vylie, 1
Car.& K., 257 ), the expelled nener took the latter cou-rse
and endeavored to enter the societies' room but was kept out
by a polic11':o. Mc therefore brought an action again.t the
defendants who had stationed the policeman thorr for the pur-
pose, and recovered a verdict which Lord Dennma refused to
set aside.
It is believed however that decisions may be found which
support actions for damages by the expelled member without
his previously resorting to force to assert his rights.
See ( Ludowishi v. Benevolent Society, 20 1.o. App., 337).
-24-
CHAPTER VI.
-- 0--
LIABILITY OF MEMBERS FOR SOCIETY DEBTS
Thts branch of our subject is perhaps of the most
practical importance to members of a college fraternity.
Much uncertainty howevor exists in the law of the individual
liability of the members of a voluntary association, partic-
ularly if it has no pecuniary gain for its object, and it is
difficult to frame any rules to cover this branch of our sub-
ject which we can state positivcly to be the lawr. We assume
at the outset that the society is unincorporated , for in the
case of an incorporated society different considerations
apply. Much also depen.l. upon the jurisdiction , for courts
in different jurisdictions differ in their views of the na-
ture and basis of this libility. A discuszion of the
specific cases which have arisen in the different jurisdict-
ions is beyond the limits of tnis work which permit only a
general survey of the subject.
The earlier decisions indicate the prevalence of the
-25-
erroneous idea to which *ya, A.ave heretofore alluded that every
association of individuals must be either a corpoartion or a
partnership, and hence when the association a charter
or legislative grant, it was treated as a partnership and its
members were held liable as partners for debts of the associ-
ation. Subsequently the courts began to treat these orga-
nizations, in respect to their internal management, more like
the corporation , but in their dealings with outside parties
they were still treated as partnerships. Finally a distinct@
ion was riade between volumtary associations v.which have pecu-
niary benefit for their cbrject such ss rutual benefit socie-
ties etc., and those societies which exist solely for the
pleasure of their members, of which the college fraternity is
a prominent illustration. As to the former class the partner-
ship liability is to some extent retained, but, as to the
latter, it has been held in the more progressive jurisdictions
that no liability attachez to a member by virtue of his mem-
bership, and that it can only arise through the principles of
agency. The courts take this position in Massachusetts,
Oonnecticut, New York, Pennsylvania and probably in other
jurisdictions.
Volger v. Ray, 13_1 Mass., 439.
Ash v. Guie , 97 Pa.St., 493.
Davidson v. Hold, ln, 55 Conn., 10U.
McCa'be v. Goodfellow,173 N.Y., 8.
This doctrine was introduced in New York in tre case of
McCabe v, Goodfollow, which overruled the previously existing
doctrine in that State as laid down in(Park v. spaulding, 10
Hun, 128), a case in which the moebrs were held liable as
partners. The court in McCabe v. Goodfellow pointed out the
distinction above mentioned and held that in societies formed
for moral, benevolent, social, or political purposes , the
individual liability of the members for contracts made by the
association or its officers or corrmittces depends upon the
application of the principles of the law of agency and au-
thority to create such liability will not be presumed or im-
plied from the existance of a -eneral power to attend to or
transact the business or promote the object for which the
society was formed except where the debt contracted is nec-
essary for its preservation.
-27-
If the above doctrine be accepted as the correct one it
follows that no individual merber c1 , society is liable for
goods supplied to the society or for debts otherwise incurred
by it if he has not in some way -ledged his -ersonal credit.
This he may do imnediately by his own contracts, orders, or
representations, or fediately through other persons acting
as agents. The degree of authorization which will suffice
to fix liability on an individual membcr of a society remains
an open question at present. In older cases dealing with
the pledging of personal credit some action of a distinct
and conscious character was held necessary on the part of the
individual sought to be charged . But as the law now appears
to stand it is of no legal significance that the defendants
did not intend to be individually responsible, or that they
did not lnow or believe that as a matter of law they would be.
Personal liability is incurred if there has been an "authori-
zation" eithvY actual or constructive, involving in liability
even a person who had no intention of pledgin- his personal
credit and who had but the slightest knowledgi of the tran-
saction.
-)I-
In this connection it is irnportaat to bear in mind the
distinction between general and s:ecial agents, hen liabili-
ties have been incurred by general agents acting within the
scope of their authority all the members may be fairly pre-
sumed to have authorized or ratified such acts. Thus if the
society either b-' rule or custom allows its officials or ser-
vants to incur debts, then all the members are personally
liable and the more certain is this liability if the organi-
zation is habitually conducted on a credt 1T'inciple. But
in the case of a special agent, or of a general agent exceed-
ing the scope of I is usual line of duty, only those menrers
are individually liable who can be shown to have authorized
or ratified his acts; es1ecially if the society works on a
cash basis, the mere fact of membership will not make one
personally liable for its debts unless he can be shown to
have advised , sanctioned, or ratified the transaction.
CHAPTER VII.
THE FRATERNITY INCORPORATED.
In States like 7le York where special statutes ex-
iEt tnder which organizations like college fraternities can
conveniently become incorporatedmany such societies, espec-
ially if they oin real estate for society purposes, take ad-
vantage of the statutory privilege. lany benefits accruo to
a fraternity incorporated under the New York Statutes which
are not possessed by one hot incorporated,. In the former,
personal liCbility is to a considerable extent eliminated;
stock or bonds may be issued and this frequently facilitates
the purchase of real estate for society purposes; the powers
and liabilities of the incorporated society are more clearly
defined and being a child of the state, the watchful eye of
its stern parent furnishes a greater inducement for it to
travel the path of financial rectitude.
In New York, there are txvo laws under which clubs, soci-
eties, or associations, may be incorporated, one passed on
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the 11th. of April, 1865, the other on the 12th. of MIay, 1875.
These laws which at first sight seem to be so much alike dif-
fer in some important particulars. The act of 1875, covers
a greater variety of objects than the act of 1865. It will
largely depend therefore, upon the object aid purposes for
which the club or society is organized whether it should be
incorporated under the former or under the latter act.
It is sufficient for us to note that the college frater-
nity may be incorporated under either. The numfer of trust-
ees under the act of 1865, cannot exceed thirteen and cannot
be less than three; under the act of 1875, there cannot be
more than twenty nor less than five. Per~;onal liability
for corporate debts under Section eight of the act of 1865,
extends only to trustees; it. the act of l75, the additional
words "directors aid managers" are used. Section seven of
t1-V act of 1805, declarez that such liability shall extend
to debts payable "within" one year from the tine they shall
have been contracted. The language of section eight of the
act of 1875, is thB same except that tle word "within" is
omitted . "te result of this omission nay operate to relieve
1--
the trustees of a society,incor--c-ated under the act of 1875.
from personal liability in cases where debts are payable at
any time "within" one yearthough it is uncertain what con-
struction would be given to this larguagc by the courts.
By chapter 380 of the laws o. 1877, Corporations fored
under the act of 18C5, were given power to issue stock or
bonds or either to an amount equal to the value of their real
estate and the act cf 1865 with thi8amendmrent seems to offer
the greater advantagesto societies o,,ning or contemplating
the purchase of real estate upon which an indebtedness shall
exist. By chapter 68 of the laws of 1884, it was provided
that societies incorporatd under either of jhe above acts may
mortgage their real or personal estate upon applyin,, for and.
obtaining an order from the Supreme Court granting permission
to execute such nortgage and the granting of this permission
is r 'de discretionary with the court. ( The above acts and
ti-n anendnents to then can be found in Banks & Bro's Edition
of N.Y.PEv.Stat., Vol. Iii. pp. 2021-2027.)
There is little if any difference between incorporated
and tnincorporated societies in respect to the rules of law
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relating to expulsion and to the contractual relation between
the society and its :'eoffuers. But in the matter of the indi-
vidual liability of rarbers for debts of the-. -ociety there is
a well defined distinction sinco by t]-) common law, this lia-
bility did not attach to the member of a corporation, and h
hence they are not liable unlecs made so by the legislature.
As we have already noticedin the Xind of corporations we are
considering personal liability only extends to the trustees
and is limited to certain classes of debts.
A society may be incorporated under the act of 1865, by
filing and recording it in the office of the ;Secretary of
State and in the County in which the office of such society
is situated a certificate in writing signed by five or more
persons of full age, citizens of the United Statera majority
of whom shall be also citizens of this State; in which cer-
tificate shall be stated the name or title by which such so-
ciety shall be known in law, the particular object or business
of such society, the number of trustees , directors, or mana-
gers tc ranage the same an& the nLanc of the trustees , direct-
ors or managers for the first year of its existanco1 but such
certificate shall not be filed unless by the written consent
and approbation of one of the justiccr of the Suprome Court
of the district in which the principal office of such society
shall be located, to be endorsed on such certificate. (A form
of this certificate is given in the Appendix). The certifi-
cate must be acknowledged like a deed or any other instrument
which is to be recorded. Although the consent of a justice
of the Supreme Court is one of the conditions precedent to
the right of filing, it decidee nothing and does not preclude
the Secretary of State from passin- upon the question as to
whetherithe certificate wastauthorized by statute as he is
not bound to file a certificate which the statute does not r
authorize.
The'act of 1865 specified the amount limit of real and
personal estate which may be owned by a society incorporated
thereutnder, fixing the maximum value of real estate at r
$500000, and of personal estate at $150,000; the powers and
duties of trustees and directors; how the numrer may be in-
creased and diminished; bow the certificate of incorporation
may be amended. It also provides that it shall be the duty
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of the trustees or a majority of them in the month of Decem-
ber of each year to '°ake and file in the County Clerk's
office where the original certificate is filed, a certificate
under their hands stating the nrmes of' the trustees and of-
ficors of the corporation, with an inventory of the property
effects, and liabilities thereof, together with an affidavit
of the truth of such certificate and inventory. As this
provision of the act is frequently not complied with, it may
be well to note that in accordance with the rules of law af-
fecting do facto corporations, a regularly organized corpor-
ation vhich has duly observed the formalities of the law in
its inception man be called to account only by the State for
a subsequent failure to comply .,.7ith the requirements of the
statute under which it was created;therefore an omission to
file the above mentioned certificate and affidavit while giv-
ing ground for the Attorney General to proceed to dissolve
the nogligont or disobedient corporation, yet cannot be taken
advantage of by any private individual and can in no way
aft ct or change the (,xemption of a member from individual
liability for society debts.
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The revision of the statutes of 'New York which is now
being accomplished will include the laws providing for the
incorporation of societies similar to that which forms part of
our subject, and it is probable that after the next session
of the legislature , societies contemplating incorporation
will find an act which will have moro comrendable features
than those now on our Statute books.

APPENDIX .
Form of' Certificate under Chapter Ze8 of the Laws of 1865.
--- 0---
CERTIFICATEt CF INCORPORATIo
0OF
THE ALPHA ALPHA CHAPTER OF THE BETA BETA FRATERNITY
We, A., 1., C., D., E., F., and G. of the city of
Ithaca, County of Tompkins, State of New York, desiring to
form a society in pursuance of Chapter .G8 of the Laws of
8 entitled "An act for the Incorporation of Societies or
Clubs for certain Social and Recreative Purposes", and of the
several acts extending or amending the same, do hereby certify
i. That all of the incorporators herein named are of
full age and citizens of the United States, and a majority of
them are citizons of the State of New York.
II. That the name of such society shall be "The Alpha
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Alpha Chapter of the Beta Beta Fraternity".
III. That the object of such society is the social inter-
course and the cultivation of feelings of brotherhood and
good fellowship between its members.
IV_ That the number of Trustees to ranage the affairs
and property of the corporation shall be five.
V. That the name of the Trustees for the first year
are
A.--------
D3,--------
C.--------
D.---------
E.---------
VI. That the obr±ter house of such society is situated
in the City of Ithaca, County of Tompkins, State of New York.
IN WITNESS W1MREOF we have hereunto set our hands this
-day of------1894.
A.--------
B.--------
I----------
C.--------
State of New York:
SS.
County of Tompkins:
On this ---- day of ---- , 1894, before me
personally apDeared A., 13., C., D., E., F., and G., to me
known, and know-n to me to be the individuals described in and
who executed the foregoing certificate and they severally
acknowlodged to me that they executed the same .
John Smith
(seal) Notary Pufblic.

